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NO PROTECTORATE BUT AN ALLIANCE.
BY THE EDITOR.
NAMES are not as indifferent as they would seem. Romeo's
argument, "A rose by any other name would smell as sweet !
"
does not agree with facts. Names have associations in the minds
of the people, and there are words, like "liberty," which, bare of
meaning though they may be in some cases, possess nevertheless
an electrifying power. The significance of names must also be
considered in dealing with the populations of Cuba, Porto Rico,
and the Philippines, which have recently fallen into our possession
by right of conquest.
It is true that the control of these islands is a matter of great
importance to the United States, and to leave the possession of
their main harbor defences to chance would be a criminal neglect of
proper foresight. Should Cuba, Porto Rico, and Luzon forthwith
become independent states, their main harbors might be suddenly
seized by some powerful nation either on a flimsy pretext, or even
for actual cause, while to recover them would cost thousands of
lives, hundreds of millions of dollars and might become in the pro-
gress of time an imperative duty. Should the harbors of Cienfuegos
and Havana fall into the hands of a European power, there would
be practically an end to the American control of any Isthmian
canal; and in case we should be involved in a naval war of any
kind, we should deeply regret having surrendered Cavite and the
harbor defences of Manila.
Thus the desirability of holding these points cannot be denied.
But here the question comes in. Shall we for the sake of holding
them reduce the entire islands to submission and establish a state
of sovereignty over the populations? Here lies the difficulty of
the situation. We can easily grant the inhabitants perfect liberty
with unrestricted home rule, and it is the avowed purpose of our
government to do so. But in doing so we ought to be careful to
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avoid names that are or may become odious to the people. It will
be necessary to protect these islands against foreign aggression,
not so much for their sake as for our own, lest they become a prey
to some powerful rival. But the word protectorate suggests the
idea of vassalage and other feudal institutions. How much easier
would it be to keep a foothold in these islands by gaining their
good-will and preserving their friendship? Let our connexion with
them, which is as desirable to them as it is to us, be in the form of
a friendly alliance, and barring difference of size and power let it
be stated in terms of equality. We should accordingly replace the
words "protectorate," "sovereignty," etc., by the term "alliance"
and call these islands oflficially "allied republics." We should
thus gain the sympathy of the populations, and in critical times
the sympathy of the inhabitants may be worth more than the guns
of our soldiers.
Let us grant to the populations of our new possessions home
rule and liberty on the condition that our alliance be indissoluble
and let the management of the harbor defences be removed as
much as possible from political influence, both in the United States
and in the Islands. Let the territory be regarded as neutral ground,
belonging to the allied nations, the control of which can be strictly
regulated according to the interests and safety of both parties, and
for the sake of serving the ends of their alliance ; but let the ar-
rangements be made in terms of an alliance.
All the complications that arise from the difficulty of the
islands being subject to the United States and yet not part of them
are thus avoided. It would be impossible for us to transform
the inhabitants at once into citizens of the United States just as it
would be unfair to make Christians of the Mohammedans in the
Sulu Islands. But our responsibility for their institutions ceases
when we treat them as allies, not as subjects, and recognise their
right of regulating their home affairs according to their own notions
—which of course does not exclude the advisability of exercising a
moral influence and of persuading them to introduce reform and to
change those customs of theirs which are evidently marks of an
inferior civilisation.
The character of the relation between the United States and
the allied republics could be such that citizens of our country might
acquire, by change of residence, the right of citizenship in the
Islands, and vice versa the inhabitants of the Islands might be-
come, as soon as they lived in the United States, citizens of the
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United States, and neither the former nor the latter should for that
reason lose the citizenship of their original homes.
All these details may fairly be left to a consideration of the
practical demands made by the contracting parties. Manila, being
a conglomerate of diverse nationalities, should be divided into a
number of independent states of which the United States govern-
ment might be one, owing the territory of Cavite and other points
of strategical importance. These states might enjoy perfect home
rule and be as sovereign as are the states of our own Union, but
should be united into a confederacy for the sake of harmonising
their particular interests, of regulating their interstate relations and
of attending to the administration of the whole. By not claiming
the right of sovereignty and by avoiding all terms that savor of sub-
jection and vassalage, we shall truly become more powerful in the
Islands, for we shall gain their good-will, and instead of holding
in possession so many million slaves we shall receive that many
friends. Quot servi tot hostes; quot socii, tot amici.
